1 (Case called)

MR. CRABILL: Good afternoon, your Honor, this is Taylor Crabill for the plaintiff, Robert Jackson.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MS. COYNE: Good afternoon, your Honor, this is
Michele Coyne from Kauff McGuire & Margolis for defendants, the
American Civil Liberties Union and Lucia Tian.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

Thank you all for joining. I'm sorry we have had to put this off a couple of times. But we are here for argument on defendants' motion for summary judgment in this case. I have reviewed the papers, but I wanted to give you all a chance to take whatever time -- I was thinking 15 or 20 minutes -- to present any arguments you'd like to make on the motion.

As the movant, Ms. Coyne, you can begin.

MS. COYNE: Thank you, your Honor.

May it please the Court, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all of the plaintiff's claims.

And I just want to sort of start out by setting where this case is, which is, it's a case involving a short-term probationary employee. He was hired and fired by the same person in the space of fewer than 10 months. He was only assigned two projects in his entire tenure and produced virtually no useable work.

The record in this case is thick, in light of what I

have just said in terms of what the facts are. But most of the briefing and most of plaintiff's briefing really goes to the point of, he disputes the performance feedback that he received.

A lot of the briefing has to do with, was he really qualified, was he misled as to what the role was supposed to be? It was supposed to be one thing and it was another.

Whether the ACLU's expectations were clear or reasonable, whether the deadlines were real ones or they could be moved, and things of that nature.

But of course it's not the Court's role to parse whether the performance feedback was wise or fair, but whether there is evidence here of discrimination or retaliation.

And I will start with retaliation, which really centers on the plaintiff standing in front of a group with eight other people, not speaking, to raise issues around the ACLU. Presuming that he has established a *prima facie* case, our position is that he cannot establish pretext.

Again, a lot of this has to do with one thing, which is temporal proximity. So when somebody is an employee for 10 months and begins displaying poor performance immediately, yeah, things are close in time. However, the case law is clear, in our view, that temporal proximity alone is not enough.

In addition, here we see that the criticism of his

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performance started almost immediately. So he starts in

2 October of 2019. By November of 2019, he has already sent a

message saying, I recognize this isn't great performance by me.

In employment relationships for the performance to already be a

5 problem within a month is pretty fast.

There are other messages also that establish those performance issues, and why that's relevant here is that when the performance feedback predates any protected activity, which surely it does here, it undermines the notion of pretext.

Secondly, the temporal proximity here, he relies a lot on comments that he attributes to Lucia Tian, words to the effect of, keep quiet, be the cooler head. Our view is that that's not -- while we have to assume that that happened for purposes of this motion, that that's not evidence of anything. He admits, after meeting with Lucia, that he felt supported, that she had been supportive of him, that everyone had been supportive of him, so he certainly didn't see it as evidence of anything, and it's not.

THE COURT: What is your explanation of those comments? First of all, I am not sure -- I didn't go back and check if that comes from a deposition or a document.

So after the Southern Convening, he meets with his boss, Ms. Tian, and she instructs him to keep quiet, be the cooler head in the room, and keep calm.

Is that from a deposition?

MS. COYNE: That's his testimony as well as in the complaint, yes. Of course we dispute those comments, but we understand that for purposes of this motion we will have to assume that they happened.

However, part of his testimony also is that after the conversation -- and, as I said, we dispute that's what was said -- but what's certainly true and what he testified to is that after the conversation, whatever happened, that he sends an email talking about how supportive and, frankly, honored he feels. So whatever about the substance of that conversation, he certainly took it as I'm being supported and I'm being honored.

In addition, we cite cases in the briefs about the offer that he received of the lower position, the lower position that he ultimately took, and cases that go to the point of when somebody is a probationary employee and surely could have been terminated without further recourse, the fact that the ACLU in this case attempted to continue his employment cuts against a finding of retaliation.

Finally -- and again there is cases cited in the briefs -- as I said, he stood on stage, or at least stood in front of the room with eight other people, some of whom were ACLU employees of what they call the national office and some of whom were employees of what are called affiliates of the ACLU. But with respect to others who were national office

employees who engaged in the same exact behavior as Mr. Jackson did, meaning standing in front of a room, there is citations in the record of good things that happened to them thereafter, having engaged in the same behavior, one receiving a promotion and another getting a raise.

If I can turn now to the discrimination case, I think the most important point here, and I don't really think the plaintiff has answered it, is the same actor inference. While we recognize that that's not a mandatory inference for the Court to draw, we think in this circumstance it's a very strong inference for a couple of reasons.

First of all, again, it's a very short period of time. He is hired and within a couple of months he is saying, well, they are discriminating against me. Ms. Tian was responsible for his hiring and was also a large contributor to the decision to terminate him, a decision that was communicated to him around eight months after he started. So where there is a very short period of time, we think that there is a very strong same-actor inference to be drawn here.

As I said, I don't really think the plaintiff answers this, the notion that Ms. Tian may have suddenly decided to adopt racial animus within those few months. And we cite, again, to a case in the brief, the *Paul* case, where the Court said, well, seven months doesn't make sense that somebody could have adopted a discriminatory animus in that short period of

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It's even less here.

The same legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons apply here as they do in the retaliation case, although they are not addressed in the plaintiff's briefing, but there is really no real dispute here that Ms. Tian was responsible for the hiring. They have admitted in the 56.1 counter statement that she is the one that submitted the request that he be hired. There is some discussion in the briefing that maybe, even though she hired him, maybe she really didn't want to. That's not borne out in the record whatsoever.

David Oliver, who testified about that, admitted in his deposition, and it's cited in our brief, that he didn't know that to be the case.

The plaintiff assumes that she wanted a different candidate and incorrectly identifies an Asian candidate by the wrong name as being the person he suspects she wanted to hire. The reality is that she was the hiring manager, she requested the hiring and also contributed to the termination decision.

Finally, I'll just note that the plaintiff has withdrawn the aiding and abetting claim against Ms. Tian, so I think that's a moot point.

THE COURT: Let me just clarify the hiring and termination decision maker. Was she clearly the individual who hired Mr. Jackson, or was that a number of people involved in the decision to hire initially?

MS. COYNE: Your Honor, frankly I think it's both.

There were a committee or a group of people who were responsible for interviewing the plaintiff, and I don't think there is any dispute about this. There were a group of people who were involved in rating the candidates. Ultimately, though, the decision is made by Ms. Tian.

We cited also in our briefs to her contemporaneous emails saying, I really want to get Rob in here. He seems really qualified. He cares a lot about our work. There is no dispute that she is the one that made the request to HR to hire him.

So like lots of hiring decisions, there are people who interview a candidate who give their input, but there is no real genuine dispute here that she is the one that made the decision to hire him.

THE COURT: In terms of the termination, again, going back to that, she is the one who submits the memo. She has this committee. And you would say that the record shows that that committee is making a recommendation to her?

MS. COYNE: So they are all ranking the candidates that they interview and they are all contributing to that. Her view is consistent with that of the others, which is, he is the one that should be hired. It can be sort of difficult -- as I said, in most circumstances not just one person contributes to the decision. People have input. They give opinions. But

1 | ultimately it's her decision.

THE COURT: And with respect to the termination, same question. Who is involved in the termination, and is there one person who is the ultimate decision maker?

MS. COYNE: Ultimately, it's her decision to make but like in all organizations, she is consulting with other people. At that point he was reporting to a different supervisor, Allison Kelley. Ms. Kelley then reported up to Ms. Tian. And of course HR is involved in those discussions and those decisions as well.

If you look at the case, the *Jones v. Yonkers* case that we cited in our brief, the same-actor inference is not just dependent on somebody having sole authority, and there are very few of us that have sole authority to hire and fire people without anybody else weighing in, but it applies when they have input into the hiring and firing decision that is significant, which Ms. Tian certainly did. So she doesn't have to be the sole person.

THE COURT: Who recommended his termination? Was it Horowitz, Kelley, and Ms. Tian?

MS. COYNE: Technically speaking, I suppose, there is two different decisions here. When he is hired, he is a probationary employee. And then there is a decision made by Ms. Tian that he's not going to pass probation. I say it is sort of technically a separate decision because he is not then

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fired. She makes the evaluation -- maybe evaluation is the

word I should use -- that he is not going to pass probation.

That is sort of step one.

The next decision is, what are we going to do about it? And in that instance they made the decision to offer him the other role, the lower-level role.

Similarly, the sort of mirror of that is, at the end of several more months, when he is reporting to Ms. Kelley, Allison Kelley makes the decision again, he is not going to pass probation. So now, again, we have to make a decision about what we do about that, and in that instance the decision is to terminate him, but that's a decision ultimately that Ms. Tian is making, again, with consultation with other people.

THE COURT: Is there evidence in the record of anyone involved in those consultations saying, we should not terminate him or decline to let him pass probation?

> MS. COYNE: No.

THE COURT: I know there is somebody named Ms. Eigo. I am not sure how you say her name.

> MS. COYNE: That's right, Eigo.

THE COURT: Ms. Eigo seems to be someone who expressed reservations about his termination, perhaps. Was she on the same level as he was? What was her connection to him in the first role and the second role? I gather she was in the second role?

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MS. COYNE: Right. So Ms. Eigo did not have any -she was deposed. She was in a role similar to his. She didn't
have any supervisory authority over him. And there is also
lots of testimony in the record that she didn't really know
what he was doing. She didn't have any reason to know what
specifically he was working on. She speaks about having seen
his computer screen and it having looked like something that
she has worked on. So she wasn't in a position to make any
decision, recommend any decision. She was a peer.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Crabill, I want to give you a chance to respond however you see fit.

MR. CRABILL: Sure, your Honor. Thank you for the arguments today and for conducting them virtually.

The record is clear that there is at least, at the very, very least, a question about whether the adverse actions taken against Mr. Jackson were motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory intent.

Opposing counsel just cited to some evidence in the record, but has excluded references to other pieces of evidence that would contradict or go against what defendants are putting forward as their explanation for their reasons for the demotion of Mr. Jackson and his ultimate termination. And this evidence could clearly be interpreted by a jury to demonstrate discriminatory and retaliatory animus.

If we go first to Mr. Jackson's retaliation claims, there is a stark contrast in how Mr. Jackson was treated prior to his initial complaints at the Southern Convening in December of 2019, and the treatment of him afterwards.

Opposing counsel has pointed to supposed performance issues prior to the initial protected activities at the Southern Convening, but there is evidence in the record that Mr. Jackson was praised for his work on the first phase of the work-study project, which is the main project he was working on prior to and after the Southern Convening, that he was the one that actually set deadlines related to the project that were approved by the stakeholder, Karolyn Bonfanti, and it was Bonfanti that had to push deadlines related to her own work schedule and inability to work on the project and review Mr. Jackson's work.

Again, there is clear evidence that goes against defendants' claims that these performance issues popped up before he engaged in these protected activities.

They cite only to one Slack message where he mentions one part of his work, but if you look at the overall record related to that first phase of the work-study project and his work prior to his engaging in protected activities at the Southern Convening, it paints an overall positive picture of his work performance.

THE COURT: There is clearly evidence that Ms. Tian

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and Mr. Horowitz were talking about the fact that he was

incapable of doing some of the technical stuff that they hoped

he was doing, and he was behind on the work, and that he was

missing deadlines.

And then by December or January, they are saying to each other, we have got to find something else for him. clearly hired someone who doesn't have the technical skills to do this job.

Are you saying that that was pretextual?

MR. CRABILL: That was pretextual and those sort of critiques were happening after the Southern Convening and these additional protected activities.

The work-study project that is the thing that defendants cite to as supposed performance issues and why he was ultimately demoted was broken up into two phases. first part of the work-study project was sending out a survey to ACLU employees, collecting data. And he worked with Karolyn Bonfanti to do that and ultimately was praised for that.

The more technical parts of the project that came in connection with the work-study project, the work-study report, was later, was after -- was mainly after the protected complaints at the Southern Convening and then the follow-ups thereafter, right.

At one point even in, I believe, Slack communications between Horowitz and Tian, Horowitz is stating to Tian, hey,

listen, I think it could have been Bonfanti that was the cause of these delays, right?

Ultimately, Mr. Jackson didn't know about these deadlines until Bonfanti sprung them on him at the last second. Instead of sort of investigating and looking into, hey, was Rob at fault here, was Karolyn at fault here, Tian moves immediately to sort of blame this on Mr. Jackson and then use that as a basis to justify the adverse actions that they ultimately took against him.

It's clear then, following the Southern Convening, in Ms. Tian's private communications, in Slack messages, that she was upset by what he had done, right. There was the initial comment in the meeting with Mr. Jackson about, hey, be quiet. Let other people talk, kind of let this go.

And he didn't do that. He continued to speak out. He continued to follow up with HR about the initiatives that him and his colleagues proposed at the Southern Convening, and Tian was annoyed by it. And the record is clear. It's clear in those Slack messages and it's clear in her testimony that she was upset that it was causing Rob to be distressed, and she was upset that it was causing distress to her team.

And it's not only that portion of the evidence, but also supported by Mr. Jackson's colleagues, who observed the change in treatment of him before and after the Southern Convening, noticing that Tian tried to shut down any sort of

discussions about the Southern Convening and what was discussed there during those analytic meetings, and also the way that she was supervising him. So there is clear evidence going to that retaliatory intent. At the very least, a jury could look into to that and say, these messages demonstrate that this demotion was motivated by a retaliatory intent.

THE COURT: When you say these messages, could you tell me exactly what you're talking about.

MR. CRABILL: Sure. One second, your Honor.

If you look in plaintiff's response to paragraph 27 of defendants' local rule 56.1 statement of facts, on page 15 of the counter statement it specifically references these private one-on-one Slack messages with Horowitz from 3:30 p.m. on December 18, 2019, in which he stated to Horowitz: "This Southern Convening thing is turning into a whole thing."

That's Exhibit HH of plaintiff's exhibits.

Tian then goes on to say the -- she goes on to her admit that her statement was related to "a lot of consternation among the staff at the ACLU for what happened around the Southern Convening." That's from Tian deposition transcript at page 108, lines 6 to 17.

Tian also testified: "I believe at this point I had also had the conversation with Rob and understood his concerns and understood that he was upset, so I wanted to -- I think that's an expression of the fact that, you know, this event was

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causing both individuals on the team, specifically Rob, to be upset, and also further discussion in the organization." That's at Tian's transcript, page 108, lines 6 to 25:

Tian then followed up the Slack messages to Horowitz with a message of a screaming face emotioon that she used to express her, quote, horror that members of the analytics team were, quote, upset by the events of the Southern Convening. That's all outlined --

THE COURT: You can almost read some of those messages as her being upset with the situation that led people to complain. In other words, was she sort of expressing upset that we are in this situation where people have to express frustration about the challenges within the ACLU of getting and maintaining the kind of racially diverse workforce that we want, and that she was upset about that, about the same thing they were complaining about.

MR. CRABILL: That could be one possible interpretation by a fact finder.

Another interpretation could certainly be that this is related to the fact that Rob is continuing to talk about this during his meetings with other analytics employees. There are specific references here to how it is causing a problem with members of her team.

There is a very clear understanding that she was upset by how Rob's actions at the Southern Convening and afterwards

1 were causing her team to be disrupted.

Looking even at additional parts of her testimony, she admits exactly that, that she was "not happy with the fact that the event then caused indirect impact on my own staff that caused my staff to be upset."

THE COURT: But there is a distinction between being upset about someone for complaining about discrimination and being upset with someone for complaining in a way that disrupts the work force and/or prevents a department from getting their work done, right?

MR. CRABILL: Sure, your Honor. But this was a situation -- it wasn't just a situation where, let's say,
Mr. Jackson had not been on the team, that there still would have been a disruption within the team.

It was the fact that Rob was on her team and part of those conversations, part of those complaints, part of them continuing those complaints and discussions at the ACLU, with human resources, and with his coworkers that caused that sort of disruption and caused what was happening with her team.

That's clear from declarations submitted by Mr. Jackson's coworkers about the fact that Ms. Tian was trying to shut him down when he was discussing those things.

Sorry. I'm just reviewing my notes. One second, your Honor.

Plus, counsel also cited to, temporal proximity was

not enough. Of course there was a short temporal proximity

2 here between the protected activities, specifically the

complaints made during the Southern Convening in mid December

2019, and then the ultimate demotion just weeks later.

And it wasn't just weeks between the initial protected activity. Like I mentioned, Mr. Jackson continued to engage in these protected activities, which was what was causing the disruption with Ms. Tian's team that we just discussed. The idea that his case is based only on temporal proximity is just not true, based on the record.

THE COURT: Any other points you wanted to highlight?

MR. CRABILL: Yes, your Honor.

In connection with opposing counsel's claim that defendants continued to employ Mr. Jackson after his probationary period, the reality is is that the ACLU, Ms. Tian, they decided to demote Mr. Jackson, and that was in an effort to try to force him out. They didn't just demote him. They tried — they demoted him four levels from where he was, slashed his salary in half, and presented him with an ultimatum: Either accept this demotion or you're fired. This wasn't a sort of charitable act, as it may being portrayed to be, and that could certainly be inferred from what's in the record by members of a jury.

There is also discussion about how the ACLU didn't discriminate against the other black men who complained, and

Mr. Young's request.

that also is not true. One of the people who Mr. Jackson complained was at Southern Convening Anwar Young. Anwar Young made a clear complaint that he was suffering discrimination at one of the affiliate offices in connection with what happened during the Southern Convening. And Mr. Jackson, as part of his further protected activities, brought those complaints to HR at

So this wasn't some sort of disconnect between the ACLU national and ACLU affiliate. They are very much intertwined, especially at the HR level, and so there was discrimination and retaliation towards at least one other member of a group who complained during the Southern Convening.

For the two other gentlemen that opposing counsel mentioned, while they may have advanced at the ACLU, they weren't working under the Lucia Tian, who was the main driver of the discrimination and retaliation against Mr. Jackson.

Moving on to the discrimination claims, there was a discussion about the same act or inference, how there was — and discussion about the hiring committee and Ms. Tian's role. David Oliver's declaration, which was provided in support of Mr. Jackson, very clearly outlines that there was this committee put together to hire for this new special-projects lead role and that the committee members, including Mr. Oliver and some of the other members who had been at the ACLU, even predating Ms. Tian, saw the opportunity to add more diversity

to the ACLU with the hire and also add someone who was not a
technical employee. They had enough data scientists. They had
enough data analysts. They needed someone who could work
between the group and the ACLU's other offices in order to
facilitate projects.

So in his declaration, and likely testimony at trial, he mentioned that Tian had very different desires on who to hire and that ultimately while it was the group decision in hiring Mr. Jackson, Ms. Tian had a different preference and it wasn't for Mr. Jackson.

THE COURT: Was Oliver deposed?

MR. CRABILL: Oliver was deposed, yes.

THE COURT: The statements you're mentioning, are they in a declaration or in his deposition?

MR. CRABILL: They are in his declaration, and I would need to check back to the deposition transcript to see exactly what was said in connection with those. I believe he was questioned on the statements that he made, but I would need to check back to see if it was also mentioned in his deposition.

THE COURT: So as I understand it, he says something like, Ms. Tian wanted someone with more technical experience, but doesn't indicate who, but ultimately agrees with the others that Mr. Jackson should be hired, right?

MR. CRABILL: Ultimately, yes. Against what she preferred, she followed the group's decision to hire

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that shows that this case should go to trial, one key point of

evidence is Ms. Kelley's message in response to Rob's farewell

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1 email.

In August of 2020, which was Mr. Jackson's last day at the ACLU, he sends an email about the discrimination and retaliation that he has been experiencing at the ACLU. He outlines it.

In response to that, Kelley sends a message, a Slack message, in which she admits — let me just get the language — in which she, in part, mentions "I want to acknowledge that I completely understand why Rob shared what he did yesterday. I see the ways in which racism and white supremacy played a part in his experience here and how he was experiencing things differently than I was. I take responsibility for not exploring what was happening in the org, and especially around the Southern Convening, and have been reflecting on this a lot. I know there was real harm done, and there is no excuse for it."

Clearly, a jury could infer from this message that Kelley is acknowledging the racism, white supremacy, discrimination that Rob has been experiencing at the ACLU.

At that point she had been his supervisor for many months, six, seven months, since she had come on. She had been interacting with Tian the entire way in her management of Rob. Tian had a hand in that the entire time.

And so in response to his message and when she says, hey, listen, I've been discriminated against the entire time I

was here, Kelley is saying, yeah, I had a chance to, you know,

be with Rob for many months now, and that's what happened to

him. That certainly could be an inference that a jury makes

and further evidence why this case should go to trial.

Further supporting that, Kelley, before she sends this message, confides in a coworker in private Slack messages, one on one, hey, listen, I'm thinking of sending this message. What do you think, basically? Right. And in those messages they discuss how Tian, Horowitz, the ACLU at large could be very upset by what she is sending. They talk about the ultimate HR question in which, by sending this message, do I put myself at risk for retaliation. There are very key pieces of evidence here that defendants might try to ignore or don't want to acknowledge at this point of the litigation, but, at the very least, should be presented to a jury.

THE COURT: Doesn't she explain in her deposition that she knew that sending a message like this expressing empathy for someone in Mr. Jackson's position and sort of acknowledging systemic racism, I guess, she knew HR wouldn't like it because it would show up in a plaintiff's brief, and here we are talking about it in a plaintiff's brief. Isn't that what she was talking about?

MR. CRABILL: She could have been, or the inference based on the additional evidence in the case could be that she was acknowledging the discrimination and retaliation that he

1 experienced at the ACLU, right.

The fact that she testified after the lawsuit has been filed about what she claims her intent was is certainly something to be examined by the jury. How credible is that. She made these statements never thinking — thinking maybe they could be part of a lawsuit, but certainly doing them — at least the ones with her colleague, Brooke Madubuonwu, in private Slack messages.

Let's let a jury decide what intent she had and what her credibility is in her deposition testimony.

THE COURT: She was his boss and recommended that he be terminated, right?

MR. CRABILL: She ultimately, in collaboration with Tian and others, ultimately decided that he should not pass the probation period related to the data analyst position, but very much that was Tian's final decision.

If you're looking at the statement that I just referenced, she is acknowledging her own failures in mentoring him and essentially saying I wish I had done more, I wish I had been more racially literate to understand what was happening to Rob so I could be a better supervisor.

It could be argued to a jury that she understood exactly what was going on in terms of what Tian's ultimate motivation was in trying to drive Rob out of the ACLU and, for those reasons, had to go along with what she understood to be

1 | Tian's desire.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Anything else?

MR. CRABILL: Nothing from plaintiff, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Coyne, anything you would like to reply to?

And specifically I wonder if you could address the comment that plaintiff's counsel made about the sprung deadlines and Ms. Bonfanti sort of springing those deadlines on him so that he was essentially — it was her fault that he was behind and not anything relating to his own performance.

MS. COYNE: Yes. Thank you, your Honor.

So, first off, as I said at the very outset of my argument, that's arguing around not fair or, it shouldn't have been that way. Those are not within the purview of the Court to say whether or not the deadlines were fair, were they real deadlines, could they have been moved.

And I want to refer back to something your Honor raised a question about, which is evidence of the performance issues before the Southern Convening. If we go back, he starts in October. The Southern Convening is December 13. That there is any evidence of poor performance for somebody that's been there just two months is somewhat surprising, but that's how bad it is.

And you referenced Slack messages. There are Slack

messages that Ms. Tian sends to Mr. Jackson. It's Exhibit 19 of my declaration where she is saying, hey, what's going on with this? I haven't heard from you. And it's in that exchange that he says, I recognize this isn't great performance or good performance from me.

So the fact that there is those indications even that early into somebody's employment -- again, we are talking about a very truncated period of time. To say it wasn't fair or it was really Karolyn Bonfanti's fault is about arguing around whether we were fair or whether the decisions that we made about judging his performance were correct ones.

Secondly, I want to reference a couple of other points on that. Mr. Crabill mentioned that there are coworkers who said that his treatment changed. I believe Mr. Crabill is referencing David Oliver. This is reference in our papers. He cites to Mr. Oliver's deposition, pages 151 to 154, for that sweeping conclusion.

Mr. Oliver -- and there is a reason why he cites to three pages, because there is a long back and forth about, well, there was some meeting, and Rob said something about something, and she said something about, take this off line.

And when I questioned him about other occasions where something like that happened, he specifically says no, he can't remember any. To just say, well, there is coworkers who say, you really have to look at those pages in Mr. Oliver's testimony.

Mr. Crabill also mentioned Anwar Young. Mr. Young was not an employee of the ACLU national. The two people that we referenced who were treated favorably after the Southern Convening are employees of the national entity, the ACLU, as opposed to one of its affiliates. The ACLU doesn't control the employment of those folks.

If I can also refer to a couple of points on the discrimination piece. Again, Mr. Oliver was deposed about whose decision it was and whether there was some majority rule. That's on pages 110 to 111 of his deposition. He doesn't support the notion that it had some majority rule to it.

As Mr. Crabill has already acknowledged just moments ago, Ms. Tian was ultimately the decision maker with respect to the termination, so we think we have got a very clear same-actor inference here.

Also, Mr. Crabill again selectively quotes from that Allison Kelley message. So if you want to sort of say, well, this is what she must have meant, we know what she meant because she goes on to say that she feels a lot of anger at how Mr. Jackson has portrayed the situation and changed the narrative, and how she is hurt specifically for Lucia, who advocated for Rob more than anyone. Mr. Crabill doesn't reference that in his brief or here today, but in terms of that message, that's what she refers to. She specifically is calling out her view that Ms. Tian advocated for Rob more than

1 anybody else did.

Finally, you are correct, of course, your Honor, that Ms. Kelley testified about having sort of spoken without approval from HR about the circumstances of Mr. Jackson's employment. To say she was afraid of retaliation or something is made up out of whole cloth.

MR. CRABILL: Your Honor, if I can just respond.

THE COURT: Before you do, just one quick follow-up.

I want to go back to the issue of performance again.

I guess I am just wondering. Other than the Slack message that you mentioned, Exhibit 19, that you rely on, which is

Mr. Jackson saying something about his own performance on the project, or whatever it was about his performance. Then there is a reference later, like in January, about Mr. Horowitz saying, well, was it partly the delay of Bonfanti? And Ms. Tian saying, well, no. It's the performance thing.

Is there other stuff in between, sort of contemporaneous evidence that they at the time, in that October, November, December period, that they had issues with performance? Are there other Slack messages either between Horowitz and Tian or other evidence besides those sort of couple of circumstantial data points?

MS. COYNE: I believe before the Southern Convening it's the messages that are at Exhibit 19, which are a series of messages, not just one.

As I said, he has been there a month. So the fact that his supervisor is saying, hey, what's going on with this, can you send me what you have, I haven't heard from you for a few days, can you sign into the meeting, for an employee who has been there for a month is a lot in terms of performance.

Yeah, it's the messages that are Exhibit 19 of my declaration.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Crabill.

MR. CRABILL: Sure.

First, to go back to your Honor's initial follow-up question around the Bonfanti situation in connection with the work-study project and the deadlines. It's not a situation about whether the work-study report, whether the graphs were correct, whether the numbers were right. It's about the way in which Mr. Jackson was treated compared to other people who were clearly — or at least Ms. Bonfanti clearly demonstrating not the greatest performance, right. She is not letting
Mr. Jackson know about a deadline that he is supposed to know about. She at this time, leading up to late January 2020, she is scrambling to get survey responses, which she is supposed to be responsible for.

If you look even to Slack messages between

Mr. Horowitz and Mr. Jackson from May of 2020, Mr. Horowitz is

still working on the work-study project, and he's working with

Bonfanti, and he is critical, to say the least, of

Ms. Bonfanti's work and, frankly, his wanting to work with her.

This was a project that was the first time that the analytics department was helping with this project. Prior to 2019, 2020, the analytics department didn't do this. Bonfanti was doing this on her own, and they had to use what she had gathered over several years to help put this report together.

And so Bonfanti is dropping the ball, Horowitz is acknowledging the difficulties with Bonfanti and how that may have contributed to what was happening back in January. And so it's not about, oh, you know, the work-study report should have been this way and not this way and related to the arguments that opposing counsel is making. It's about how is he being treated differently than other people who may have had a hand in what was not going right with the work-study project at that time.

Tellingly, the decision to terminate Mr. Jackson is made, Tian is going to her supervisors and saying, hey, let's give an extension to Horowitz to finish this project, to finish the technical parts of this project.

Horowitz was the technical guy. Horowitz is the coding guy. That's the reason he was hired. If you have a problem with something technical or coding, you go to Horowitz, right, and it took him additional time to complete the project, and then he was still working on it months later.

The idea that the circumstances around the work-study

project are somehow not relevant, because it supposedly is criticizing what the ACLU's assessment of his work was, is just not accurate. The evidence is showing that this opportunity was used as a way to get the squeaky wheel out of the ACLU, which eventually defendants did.

MS. COYNE: Your Honor, if I may.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. COYNE: To be clear, again, I think that was just an argument about thinking we did the project wrong or should have been handled differently. But from a legal perspective, if Mr. Crabill is suggesting that Ms. Bonfanti was treated more favorably, she is not similarly situated to the plaintiff anyway. She is in finance. She didn't report to Ms. Tian. So whether she should have done it differently or her deadlines were wrong or something is of no consequence.

Mr. Horowitz is also not similarly situated to the plaintiff. And the fact that Mr. Horowitz was working on it was because the plaintiff didn't finish it.

In any case, they are not similarly situated to the plaintiff in terms of being comparators.

THE COURT: I think his argument is that it goes to pretext; in other words, the idea that she was kind of looking for problems with his work and saying, oh, he's clearly in above his head, etc., etc., when in fact it was this other person who was causing the delays, and that sort of goes to the

idea that she really was annoyed with him because he was a troublemaker, and he was complaining about the issues from the Southern Convening, and she was looking to nitpick.

MS. COYNE: That's exactly why, as I said before, it's not about -- that's why the Court doesn't get into decisions about whether or not we are handling our projects properly and whether Karolyn Bonfanti moved the deadline or it was really her fault or not. That's what this is all about is, I don't think -- Mr. Crabill just said, they used to do the project differently. They are entitled to make those decisions.

Whether or not there is evidence of pretext is the question.

And the fact that somebody may look at it and say, well, the deadline should have been different, and Mr. Horowitz really should have been assigned the project from the beginning is outside the Court's purview. That's not evidence of pretext.

THE COURT: Unless it suggests that she is lying, right. If it undermines the credibility or the genuineness of her performance, stated performance concerns, that is what pretext is, right?

MS. COYNE: Understood. But as we have already pointed out, these were ongoing problems since before the Southern Convening even happened.

THE COURT: And I'm asking, what evidence is there for that other than the one message from him saying, sorry I'm

1 | late, this isn't my best performance. Is there more?

MS. COYNE: There are those messages as well as
Ms. Tian's testimony about what was going on, which was cited
in the briefs as well.

MR. CRABILL: Your Honor, if I could just respond to that point.

If you're looking at the email exchanges between Tian, Bonfanti, and Mr. Jackson in connection with the first phase of the work-study project, it is painting a very different picture about what his performance is, and ultimately his performance over weeks, not just one or two messages that are being referenced here about the survey and how it was -- I can get the direct language, but how it was great, being praised for that ultimate good performance in connection with that phase of the project. It is very, very clear that all of that was happening before the Southern Convening and the protected activities.

Going to the discrimination claims, it's clear that

Tian had race on her mind. She had race on her mind in

connection with Mr. Jackson and what he was doing. That is why

I believe in the spring of 2020 she had messages with Horowitz

around what Mr. Jackson was continuing to speak out about, what

happened to him in connection with the demotion, and she had

very -- she had Slack messages with him where she had, hey, I

want to protect you, and then she removed that conversation --

she didn't delete it. She moved to a different conversation
text messages, most likely because she thought it would be an
even more private place than the Slack messages, and said, hey,
I wanted to protect you because you're a white guy. I wanted
to protect you, because you're a white man, from this black
person who is making these complaints. That's certainly an
inference that could be made by a jury.

And the ACLU's reply papers, they even admit that the ACLU apparently has this sort -- has this culture where maybe minority or nonwhite employees are going to maybe jump the gun or jump the gun about attacking white employees for discrimination.

It's clear that race was on Tian's mind throughout the relevant events of this case.

MS. COYNE: Your Honor, can I just respond to that point alone?

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. COYNE: That's not at all what that message says.

There is no reference to it being about Mr. Jackson's protected activity. That's also the language that Mr. Crabill uses in his brief. He says it's in response to plaintiff's protected activity. There is absolutely no support for that whatsoever.

This message comes five months later, in May. It doesn't have anything to do or reference any protected activity by the plaintiff.

What the discussion is about is how to handle the team
morale about Mr. Jackson's upcoming termination and about how
they are going to communicate that decision. To then say it's
about his protected activity or she has race on her mind is not
supported at all by the message.

THE COURT: OK. I understand.

Just to be clear, I had asked about kind of the evidence of the performance issues, and I know there is deposition testimony by Ms. Tian explaining it, and I assume also Horowitz and Kelley perhaps as well.

You mentioned Exhibit 19. Is Exhibit 19 the one place where I would find the evidence before the Southern Convening that existed at the time?

MS. COYNE: That's right, your Honor, along with the testimony.

THE COURT: Great. Thank you.

I think you've answered all of my questions. I appreciate it. That's helpful.

Anything else?

I can't give you a date yet when I am going to rule, but this is helpful.

I would appreciate having the transcript. If you can order it, that would be great. If you go to the Southern District website, you go to the menu at the upper right corner and go to trial support, it tells you how to order the